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CONTRACTS OF INFANTS.
All persons are infants, in legal contemplation,
until they arrive at majority. The period of majority differs
in different countries, but the general rule is twenty-one
years. By the Civil law, which obtains in some of the old
countries, emancipation does not take place until the person
is twenty-five.
It is supposed that the selection of the age of
twenty-one, rather tian some otner period, at which majority
should be attained, originated in the old feudal system, as
at that time the infant was first presumed to be physically
capable, if a male, of doing knight's service, and, if a fe-
male, not before of a suitable age, to marry any one upon whom
duties would devolve.
Bingham on Infancy, 1.
The conmon law of England from the earliest times
has fixed twenty-one as the period of absolute majority for
both sexes. The same rule applies in most of the United State
though in some of the western states females have an enlarged
capacity to act at the age of eighteen.
Stephenson v 'Yestfall, 18 Ill. 209.
The day upon which the infant attains his lawful
age is on the beginning of the day next preceding the twenty-
first anniversary of his birth. Tie case of State v Clark,
23 Harr. (Del.) was one which arose over the right of a person
to vote before his twenty-first birthday. Chief J. Bayard in
his opinion said: "It is to be observed that a person becomes
of age on the first instant of the last day of the twenty-
first year next before the anniversary of his birth; thus, if
a person were born at any hour of the first day of january,
1801, (even) a fww minutes before twelve o'clock of the night
of that day, he would be of full age at the first instant of
the 31st of December, 1821, although nearly forty-eight hours
before he had actually attained the fAll age of twenty-one,
according to years, days, hours, and minutes, because there is
not in law in this respect any fractions of a day; and it is
the same whether a thing is done upon one moment of the day oi-
another.
II.
Ve now come to our main topic, -he contracts of in-
fants. A contract as defined by Story is a deliberate engage-
ment between competent parties upon a leL al consideration to
do or to abstain from doing some act. In its iidcst sense it
includes records and specialties, but the term is usually em-
ployed to designate only simple or parol contracts. By par1
contracts is to be understood not only verbal and unwritten
contracts, bit all contracts of record not under seal. This
is strictly the legal signification of the term contract, in-
asmuch as that reciprocity of consideration and mutuality of
agreement, which are necessary to constitute a parol agree-
ment, are not necessary in obligations of record and in spe-
cialties.
III.
VOID ACTS OF AN INFANT.
The method taken in law to protect an infant against
the effects of his own weakness has been to consider his acts
as not binding, and allow him to rescind all contracts enter-
ed into by him, with certain exceptions.
There are, however, two degrees in which his acts or
instruments appear to be not binding: First, by being as if
they never existed--wholly void; and, secondly, as being de-
feasible at the election of the party with wYhom they originat-
ed; that is, voidable only.
Ringham on Infancy, 8.
A void act never is and never can be binding, ei-
ther on the party with whom it originated, or on others. No
person claiming through or under it can succeed, and the void
act can never at any time or by any means be confirmed or ren-
dered valid.
Bingham on Infancy 9.
Any person interested may take advantage of a void
act of an infant, which is not the case when the act is simp-
ly voidable.
There is much confusion in the older books on the
subject of void and voidable acts and contracts. But the
courts at a later day ,-"o on the theory that infancy being a
personal privilege, that he should be bound by no act which is
not beneficial to him,and their contracts are divided into
three classes: (1) Void (2) Voidable (3) Binding.
The main difficulty with the courts was to disting-
uish between void and voidable.
Mr. Bingham, after an exhaustive review of the Eng-
lish cases, decided that the only safe rule to follow was
that "acts which are capable of being legally ratified are
voidable, and acts which are incapable of being legally rat-
ified are absolutely void.
5Bingham on Infancy 234.
Another rule laid down by Chief J. Parker in tile
case of Witney v Dutch, 14 Mass. 457 was tlat "whenever the
act done may be for tne infant's benefit, it sniall not be con-
sidered void; but he shall ave his election ,inen he comes of
age to affirm or avoi3 it. Another rule, cited and approved
by Judge Story, was that ",here the court can pronounce that
the contract is for the benefit of tLe infant, then it shall
bind him, and .Y.vere it is prejudicial to the infant, it shall
be void; and where it is of an uncertain nature, the infant
shall have his election of affirming or avoiding it.
But these old rules have been to some extent modi-
fied, and the tendenc, of the courts at tnie present time is to
regard all contracts of infancy voidable only.
In support of this doctrine may be cited the case
of Fetiow v 'Viseman, 40 Ind. 184, here the authorities are
collected and reviewed, and the rule is stated as follows:
"First, that an infant's contracts for necessaries are as
valid and binding upon the infant as the contracts of an adult;
and that such contracts cannot be disaffirmed, and need not
be ratified before they can be enforced. Second, the con-
tract of a- infant appointing an agent or attorney is abso-
lutely void and incapable of ratification. Third, any contract
that is illegal by reason of being against a statute or pub-
lic policy is absolutely void and incapable of ratification.
Fourth, all other contracts made by an infant are voidable
only, and may be affirmed or disaffirmed by the infant at his
election when he arrives at his majority."
So also an infant's bond with penalty ana for the
payment of interest was formerly held to be void on the ground
that it cannot possibly be for his benefit.
Fisher v Mowbray, ' East. 330.
So a bond executed by a minor as surety is void.
Allen v Minor, 2 Call. 70
An infant's promissory note as surety is void.
Maffles v Wightman, 4 Conn. 376.
But the old authorities at the best are not very
clear upon this point. All of them seem to admit a distinc-
tion between void and voidable, and yet seem to disagree with
respect to the acts to be classed under either of those heads.
One result in which they all appear to agree is
stated by Lord Mansfield in the case of Zouch v Parsons, 3
Burr., that whenever the act done may be for the benefit of
the infant, it shall not be considered void, but that he shall
have his election wnen he comes of age to affinm or avoid it,
and this appears to be the only clear and definite proposi-
tion which can be extracted from the authorities. The appli-
cation of this principle is, however, not free from difficulty,
7for when a note or other simple contract is made by an infant
himself, it may be made ood by his assent without any inqui-
ry whether it was for his benefit or to his Frejudice. For if
he had made a bad bargain in a purchase of goods, and -ives
his promissory note for the price, and when he comes of age
had agreed to pay the note, he would be bound by his agreement
although he might have been ruined by the purchase.
I think the reasoning laid down in 'Vhitney v Dutch,
14 Mass. 157, is correct, and the rule which is followed to-
day, namely, "All simple contracts by an infant which are not
founded on an illegal consideration are strictly not void but
voidable, and may be made good by ratification. They remain a
legal substratium for a future assent until avoided by the
infant, and if instead of avoiding he oonfirm them when he hs
a legal capacity to make a contract, they are in all respects
like contracts made by an adult.
As an example of the trend of the courts in this di-
rection may be mentioned the case of Yates v Lyon, 61 Barb.
205. The text-books lay down the rule that an assignment made
by a firm, one of whom is an infant, for the benefit of cred-
itors will be void, and cite the above case as an authority
for tnat proposition; but a careful reading of the case will
show that the court, although they held that assignment void,
yet were inclined to hold that if the infant be justly indebt-
8ed to his creditors, they ought to be paid. So also, as be-
fore stated, it was formerly held th'at bonds given by infants
vith penalties attached were void, but accor-ing to later de-
cisions they are only voidable.
Weaver v Jones, 24 Ala. 420.
Same rule in regard to promissory notes.
Swasey v Vanderheyden, 10 Johns. 33.
Fetiow v 71iseman, 40 Ind. 140.
So also as to the assignment or in. orsement of a
promissory note or bill of exchange.
Nightingale v Withington, 15 Mass. 272.
Professor Parsons lays down the rule in general
terms that "the contract of an infant (if not for necessa-
ries) is voidable; that is, he may disavow it and so annul it,
either before his majority or within a reasonable time afte
lt;u and in a note appended to this declaration, while frankly
admitting that the rule, that those contracts are voidable only
which are for the infant's benefit, and those which are prej-
udicial are absolutely void, is adopted and recognized by
many authorities, advances the opinion that this distinction
is now practically obsolete, and unqualifiedly asserts that
the more recent authorities 'iold that all contracts of infamts,
with the exception perhaps of the appointment of an attorney,
are voidable only and none absoliutely void.
Parsons Mercantile Law 4.
IV.
ACTS BINDING UPON THE INstANT.
Contracts for necessaries are binding upon an infant.
The ground upon vhich the contracts of infats for
necessaries are enforced has been said to be not because they
are contracts, but only "since an infant must live as well as
a man" the law gives a reasonable price to those who furnish
him with necessaries.
This class includes by far the greatest number of
cases in which an infant is liable on his contracts. The
legal term "necessaries" is a relative term, not strictly lim-
ited to such things as are absolutely requisite for support
and subsistence, but to be construed liberally and varying
with the degree and estate, the rank, fortune, and age of the
infant.
Rainsford v Fernvick, Carter R. 215.
His real and not his ostensible fortune and circum-
stances, however, constitute the test and criterion as to
whether the articles are necessaries or not. Story v Perry,
4 Carr. Ic P. 526.
Another rule laid down in the case of Peters v
Fleming, 6 1ees. & Wels. 42, is as followvs: "The term neces-
saries includes such things as are useful and suitable to
I0
the state and condition in life of the party, and not merely
such as are required for bare subsistence. It is a question
for the jatry whether the articles are such as a reasonable
person of the age and station of ti:e infant would require for
real use."
Food, lodging, clothes, medicine, and education, to
use concise words, constitute the five leading elements in t.u
doctrine of the infant's necessaries. But to apply a prac-
tical test we must construe these five wor'cis in a very liber-
al sense, and somewhat according to the social position, for-
tune, prospects, age, circdmnstances, and general situation of
the infant himself.
Schouler 622.
Articles of mere ornament are not necessaries. The
true rule to be taken is that all such articles as are purely
ornamental are not necessary and are to be rejected, because
they cannot be required for any one; and for such matters,
therefore, an infant cannot be made responsible. But if they
were not of this description, then the question arises whether
they w re bought for the necessary use of the party, in order
to support himself properly in the delree, state, and station
of life in which he moves. If they were for such articles
the infant may be made responsible.
Porters v Fleming, 6 1-1. , W. 42.
An infant's board bill w,hile attending school is
included among necessaries for which he may be compelled to
pay.
Kil;ore v Rich, 83 Me. 305.
In fact anything which is needful to the infant's
wants comes Linder the head of necessaries.
No express promise is necessary in order to render
an ihfant liable for necessaries.
Gray v Ballou, 4 Wend. 403.
And though an infant is liable on Kis implied con-
tract for necessaries, yet it seems well settled that he is
not bound by his contract to pay a sum certain therefor as an
account stated, but only for what they are reasonably worth.
Beeler v Young, 1 Bibb. 519.
Oliver v Woodroffe, 4 M. & W. 670.
As a general rule it is the tradesman's duty to ac-
quaint himself with the infant's circumstances and necessities,
as well as to take notice of supplies by other tradesmen; he
credits him at his peril.
Davis v Caldwell, 12 Cush. 513.
Kline v L' Armoureux, 2 Paige Ch. 419.
But under certain circumstances inquiry as to the-
ther the articles are necessaries may be dispensed witn by
the party firnishing the infant. Thus in the case of Dalton
12
v Gib, 7 Scott 117, wvlere an infant, living in a style of som
pretension, purchased of a tradesman in the course of fbur
months silks to the amount of thirty-five pounds, some of whicL
were delivered in the presence of her mother, it was held that
this presence of the mother when the da~ighter purchased the
articles, and her omission to reject those which were deliv-
ered to the daughter rendered inquiry unnecessary. But if the
wants of the infant be supplied by his parent or guardian, or
b" any other person, he cannot tender himself lihble for ar-
ticles which would otherwise be necessaries.
Angell v Mc Clellan, 16 Mass. 31.
Waiting v Toll, 9 Johns. 141.
Among those articles not adjudges necessaries in
ordinary cases are articles of mere luxury for the infant
himself, or for the entertainment of his friends, horses and
grain or harness for them, unless necessary in carrying on
his business, loans of money, liquor, etc.
Brooks v Scott, 11 MI. -: W. 67.
WIharton v Mc Kenzie, 5 Q. B. 606.
Merriam v Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40.
I think the correct rule is laid down in Peters v
Fleming, before cited, and the one generally followed by the
courts, viz., "that the term necessaries includes such things
as are useful and suitable to the estate and condition in
life of the party, and not nerely such as are required for
bare subsistence; and it is a question for tue jury whether
the articles are such as a reasohable person of the age and
station of the infant would require for real use."
V.
RATIFICATION AND CONFIPATION OF INFANTS' CONTRACTS.
It is a universal rule that an infant cannot in any
way affirm his avoidable acts or contracts during his minority.
Reeves on Domestic Relations 349.
Corey v Burton, 32 Mich. 30.
Dunton v Brown, 31 Mich. 182.
But after an infant has arrived at full age '-e mr
if he chooses ratify any such acts or contracts. The mode in
which they ma> be ratified is sometimes prescribed by statute,
but in the absence of any statutory provision the court in
Kline v Beebe, 6 Conn. 4S4, layd down the folloiing rules,
and claims either will be sufficient: (1) BY an express rat-
ification. (2) By the performance of acts from w.,hich an af-
firmance may reasonably be implied. (3) By the omission to
disaffirm .ithin a reasonable time. In England the question
of ratification is settled by statute providing that the rat-
ification to be binding must be in writing signed by t.ie par-
ty.
Stat. 9 Geo. IV, c. 14.
In this country some of the states have similar
provisions.
Thurlow v Gilmore, 40 Me. 37b.
The authorities seem to be considerably at variance
in states where we have no statute, which is generally the
case, as to what will constitute an affirnance. One line of
authorities holds that a direct promise after majority is
necessary to establish a direct contract made during minority,
and that a mere acknowledgement will not have that effect.
Brocton v Sears, 4 Allen 95.
But this doctrine is repudiated in Henry v Root,
33 N. Y. 545. Judge Davies, in his opinion in this case, cites
a large number of cases, and discoukses this point at great
length, and holds that any act or declaration which recogniz-
es the existence of the promise as binding is a ratification
of it. As in the case of agency, anytiing which recognizes
as binding an act done by an agent, or by a party who has
acted as agent, is an adoption of it." But at the best what
amounts to a ratification is a very close question. A direct
promise to pay would seem to be a complete ratification, but
then again the question arises as to what is a direct promise.
I think the rule laid ,1own by Judge Davies in Henry
v Root, supra, correctly states the doctrine in New York:
"That a new promise, positive and certain, equivalent to a ner
contract, is not essential; but a ratification or confirmation
of what was -lone ,luring minority is suL'ficient to make the
contv'act obli!atory."
Practically the same view is held in Whitney v
Dutch, 14 Mass. 457, where the court says: "The terms of the
ratification need not be such as to import a direct promise
to pay. All that is necessary is that the infant after attainl-
ing majority should expressly agree to ratify his contracts
by words, oral or in writing, or by acts which import a rec-
ognition and a confirmation of the promise."
Then there is no express promise the general rule
is that acts which show otmership and enjoyment of the prop-
erty with knoviedge of all the circumstances, or recognition
of the validity of the contract, without any act or declara-
tion of disaffirmance, are sufficient; as retaining possess-
ion, using, selling, mortgaging, or converting the property
to the infant's om use.
Chapin v Shafer, 409 N. Y. 407.
Also part payment.
Henry v Root, 33 N. Y. 526.
A ratification of the contract has often been infer-
red from the silence of the infant after his arrival at full
age, coupled with his retaining possession of the consideration,
or availing h~mself in any manner of his conveyance; such as
his reception of rent under a voidable lease.
Morgan v Morgan, 1 Atk. 4 k.
The omission to disaffirm a contract within a ra-
sonable time has been held sufficient ratification.
2 Kent's Com. 295.
Dallas, J., in the case of Holmes v Blogg, 8 Taunt.
35, said: "The infant is bound to give notice Lf the disaf-
firmance of a voidable contract within a reasonable time."
In this case the court held that he ought to give notice with-
in four months. But this point has been discussed in several
cases in different states, and they hold what will be a rea-
sonable time will be governed by the circumstances in each
case.
Jenkins v Jenkins, 12 Ia. l95.
Stout v Merrill, 35 Ia. 56.
Wallace's Lessee v Lewis, 4 Harr. (Del.) 80.
State v Plaisted, 43 N. H. 414.
VI.
AVOIDANCE OF INFANTS' CONTRACTS.
A large majority of an infant's contracts may be
disaffirmed by him at his election. But having once exercis-
ed that right he cannot retract. Thus it was held in the case
of Edgerton v Wolf, 6 Gray 458, that if he surrenders property
received under a contract of purchase, evidently intending
thereby to give up all his interest in it, he cannot afterwards
recall such surrender and retake the property. As for the
time of the exercise of this right, contracts respecting
personal property may be disaffirmed during the infancy of tL
maker, or within a reasonable time after he attains nis maj-
ority.
Chapin v Shafer, 49 I. Y. 407.
Stucke v Yorder, 33 Ia. 173.
But the rule is otherwise in regard to real estate.
In the case of Zouch v Parsons, 3 Burr., the question arose
whether the conveyance could be avoided by him during infancy
and it was held that it could not. This case has been deemed
conclusive authority on this point, and has been generally
followed since.
Emmons v Murray, 16 N. H. 386.
Bool v Mix, 17 Wend. 119.
The modes of disaffirmance are various according to
the nature of the act or contract to be disaffirmed, and the
circumstances of the particular case. The general rule is
that there must be some positive and decided act of dissent
adverse to the original act.
Jackson v Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539.
Th s a contract of service may be disaffirmed by
simpl-y leaving tne employer and engaging in the service of
another, or by an action for tne value of the labor performed.
Thitmarsh v Hall, 3 Denio 375.
A conveyance of the same land after majority by
a deed inconsistant with the first has been held sufficient.
Irvine v Irvine, 9 Wall. 617.
But it is held in New York before suit can be brought
by an individual to recover the possession of lands conveyed
during infancy, he must make an entry upon the lands and exe-
cute a record deed to a third person, or do some other act of
equal notoriety in disaffirmance of the first deed, such as
demanding possession or giving notice of an intention not to
be bouni by the first deed.
Voohries v Voohries, 24 Barb. 150.
Illinois, however, and dome other states by statute
make conveyances of minors binding unless disaffirmed within
three years after ',is majority; if not within that time they
;vill be upheld.
Blaukenship v Stout, 25 Ill. 132.
It seems to me that this is the reasonable rule,
and one which ought to be adopted in all the states. Three
years is a reasonable time, and it seems to me would do away
with a great deal of litigation to adopt such a rule general-
ly.
VII.
MUST THE INFANT RESTORE THE CONSIDERATION UPON RESCINDING?
The next point to be considered is xhether or aot
the infant must return the consideration upon repudiating the
19
contract, and this is a mooted question at this time with the
courts. In the case of Bartholemew v Finnemore, 17 Barb.
428, where an infant purchased a horse of the defendant and
paid for him in property which he delivered to the defendant,
and after he had kept the horse about two months, during
which time by misuse the horse was greatly lessened in value,
and then tendered him back and demanded a return of the prop-
erty, it was held that he could not recover the property
without returning the consideration received by him. Justice
Hand in discussing this point said: "After the infant has en-
joyed the benefit of the property in whole or in part, there
is no equity in his avoiding his contract and reclaiming the
property he delivered in exchange, without restoring the con-
sideration, or at least an equivalent."
This same view is held in the following cases:
Holmes v Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508. Taft v Pike, 14 Vt. 415.
Kitchen v Lise, 11 Paige 107.
But in the case of Carpenter v Carpenter, 45 Ind.
142, Judge Worden reviewed a large number of cases, and holds
that the consideration need not be returned. In his opinion
he says: "The contracts df infants except those for necessa-
ries are void or voidable; and those in relation to personal
property may be rescinded during infancy. The false represen-
tations made by the plaintiff (the infant), as alleged, that
20
he was of full age, does not make the contract valid, and does
not estop him from setting up his infancy in avoidance of tne
contract, although it may furnish ground of an action against
him for tort. .. . . Upon icoking into the case the
plaintiff was not bound to make any tender of the property at
all before he could maintain the action. Upon the avoidance
of the contract by the plaintiff, the case stood as if none
had been made, and the plaintiff's claim to his horse became
at once complete."
But it is held in the case of Green v Green, 69 N.Y.
553, if the infant has consumed, or wasted, or disposed of the
consideration received, he can still disaffirm, ani that
without restoring the consideration, and the other party has
no remedy.
Stout v Merrill, 35 Ia. 47, is frequently cited by
the different authorities as holding tliat the infant cannot
rescind without restoring the consideration; but a careful
reading of the case will show that it holds precisely with
the case of Green v Green, 69 N. Y. , supra, that if he has
the consideration he must return it; but if he has wasted it
during minority, he can recover back his property without re-
turning the consideration. The ju- e in that case cites Sec.
2540 of the Statutes of Iowa which reads as follows: "A minor
is bound not only for contracts for necessaries, but also his
21
other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable
time after he attains his majority, and restores to the other
party all money or other property received by him by virtue
of the contract, and remaining within his control at any time
after his attaining his majority." So construing this stat-
ute liberally it would seem to imply tflat if the infant had
wasted the consideration before majority, he could Liisaffinr
without restoring the consideration. I think that the weight
of authority will uphold the following rule: If the infant
has or has had the consideration since attaining his majority
he must in order to affirm return the consideration; but if he
has wasted the consideration before reaching majority, then
he can disaffirm the contract and recover back his property
without returning the consideration.
Green v Green, 69 N. Y. 553.
Stout v Merrill, 35 Ia. 47.
Chandler v Simmons, 97 Aiass. 506.
One principle seems to be firmly established by the
courts: That the infant cannot on attaining his majority hold
to an exchange or purchase made by him during infancy and its
advantages, and thus affirm that while pleading his infancy to
avoid the payment of the purchase money.
Kitchen v Lee, 11 Paige 107.
Kerr v Bell, 44 Mo. 120.
Klein v Bell, 6 Conn. 494.
Thus an infant mortgagor cannot repudiate his pur-
chase money mort~fage and still keep t'Ie property.
Curtis v Yc Dougal, 26 0. St. 66.
Otter man v Moak, 3 Sandf. Ch. 431.
hite v Brouch, 51 Int. 210.
The effect of the disaffirmance of a contract which
is wholly executory is to release t ].e aaiuit as well as trhe
infant, and place them both in statu quo. If it is executory
only on the part of the a~ult, the infant may recover back
whatever he has advanced, or the value of services rendered
by him under it, unless he has received benefit from it before
disaffirmance, in which case he cannot recover.
Millard v Howlett, 19 Wend. 301.
The aim of the courts on this point seems to be to
do justice as nearly as possible between the parties, and if
it is possible without taking away too many of the righ'1ts of
the infant, to place them in the position in which they were
at the beginning of the traRmaction.
VII.
LIABILITY OF TIFARCT FOR TORTS AND FRAUDS.
Infants are generally :;eld responsible t,;e sace as
afIults for torts committed by tf.em, and when they are liable
at all the remedies and rules of evidence are the same a6ainst
them as against adults.
Haile v Lillie, 3 Hill 149.
Hartfield v Roper, 21 Wend. 615.
Bullock V Babcock, 3 Vend. 391.
So some authorities hold titat an infant who hires
a horse to go to a place agreed on, but goes to some ot.er
place in a differeit direction, he is liable in trover or con-
version for an unlawful conversion of the horse.
Homer v Thyng, 3 Pick. 392.
Morton, J., who delivered the opinion in this case,
said: "The defense in this case is infancy. It is contended,
too, that this action is founded in contract, and tiat t-e
defendants cannot be ousted of this defence by changing trie
form of the action from contract to tort. Infants are liable
in actions arising ex delicto, but not those arising ex con-
tractu. The defendant, however, contends t -at there is a
qualification of this rule, and thiat infants are liable for
positive wTrongs only, and not for constructive tort. But we
know of no such distinction. . . . . . . It is true an infant
cannot become a trespasser by any prior or subsequent consent,
but he may be guilty of tort as well by omission of duty as
by the commission of positive wrongs. He is also liable fo-
frauds as well as torts, and his liability is to be determined
by the real nature of the transaction, and not by the form of
24
the action. Although an infant shall not be charged in tro-
vel- for ,oods sold to him with a knowledge of his infancy,
and althougn an action will not lie against an infant for af-
firming himself to be of full age in the execution of a con-
tract, yet detinue will lie against an infant for joods deliv-
ered upon a special contract for a specific purpose after the
contract is avoided, and assumpsit will lie against an infant
for money embezzled, for the court will look through the form
of the action into the tortious nature of tfe transaction."
But Pemrose v Curren, 3 Rowle (Penn.) squarely denies tie
proposition, and holds in a similar case that an infant may
plead his infancy in bar of an action for dama~es, and the
reasoning of Judge Rogers in this case seems to me to be
sound. He says: "This is a transaction in which parents and
guardians have a deep interest, and particularly those who
educate their children from under their own eye, at a distance
in our seminaries of learning. It ar-o ints to tuis: If a
keeper of a livery stable, or am innkeeper, whose business it
is to let out horses and carriages to hire, chooses to en-
trust tuem to minors contrary to the assent and wishes of
their parents, and an injury is done by the young man in the
folly and heedlessness of youth, going to a -iffereit place
or farthIer than was intended, the fatuer must eith-er pay the
damages or suffer his child to be disgraced by imprisonment.
. . .
..... If the plaintiff should succeed, tf-ere would be
no want of pretences upon which infants mij-t be charged, and
there would be an end to the protection ,hich the law so wise-
ly affords them. . . ." Judge Rogers also in his opinon
severely criticizes Homer v Thyng, and says that the funda-
mental error in that case consisted in considering the conduct
of the infant as a violation of a contract, whereas tiiere was
no contract which could be enforced. While the Pennsylvania
rule seems to me to be the better one of the two, yet I think
the weight of authority is in favor of the Massachusetts rule.
New York follows the Massachusetts rule, but limits
it somewhat. In the case of Moore v Eastman, 1 Hun 578, Judge
Gilbert laid down the following rule: "To render an infant
liablejwho has hired a horse, in an action for trespass, he
must do some willful and positive act which amounts to an
election on his part to disaffirm the contract; a bare neglect
to protect the animal from injury, and to return it at the
time agreed upon is not sufficient. If ie willfully and in-
tentionally injure the animal, an action of trespass will lie
against him for the tort; but not if the injury complained of
occurred in the act of driving the animal through his unskil-
fullness and want of knowledge, discretion, and j-ad6ment..
I think there is no doubt but tat the proposition
laid &odn in Homer v Thyng, tiiat an action -,ill not lie against
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an infant 'rho obtains property by representing himself to be
of full age, has been overthrown by the vcignt of authority.
Badger v Phinney, 13 Mass. 343.
Wallace v Morse, 5 Hill 3S1.
Xilgore v Jordan, 17 Tex. 349.
Hemphill, C. J., in his opinion in the Texas case,
above cited, gives an exhaustive review of the law upon this
point, going back to t: e Roman Law and following it up to
date, and he declares that the authorities are sufficient to
show that the fraudulent acts and concealments or representa-
tions of infants .'rlen made with a view to deceive and defraud
others will be as binding upon them as upon adults, and their
contracts will be enforced against them.
From this brief review of the contracts of infants
I think the following propositions, with slight exceptions,
are substantially correst, and can be maintained in New York:
(1) The contracts of infants, except for neces-
saries, .'fhich are binding, are not void but voidable.
(2) That the infant cannot affirm his voidable
contracts until he arrives at majority.
(3) That he can disaffinn his contracts .,iith re-
gard to personalty at any time, but contracts in relation to
real property cannot be disaffirmed until he reaches majority.
(4) That the affirmance of his contracts may be
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express or implied, and what will be an implied ratification
depends upon the circumstances in each case.
(5) That if the infant has the property in his
possession at the time of disaffirming, or has had it since
he attained his majority, he must return tne consideration
upon disaffirming.
(6) That the infant is liable for his willful torts
an' false representations the same as adults.

